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R. PRINCE’S NEW PORTRAITS—THE ART OF FAIR USE 
MATHILDE HALLE 
“He takes what we already know . . . and gives it back relatively 
unaltered, but forever changed.”1 
“Making art became a series of mental decisions, the most crucial of 
which was choosing the right source image: as Warhol would contend some 
years later, ‘The selection of the images is the most important and is the fruit 
of the imagination.’”2 
INTRODUCTION: NEW PORTRAITS, SAME ISSUE 
With his New Portraits series, artist Richard Prince has (again) pushed 
appropriation art to its culmination by re-using verbatim photos taken and 
posted by Instagram users as the center of his own works. And (again) his 
work has triggered some turmoil in the copyright and art law world as to 
whether or not it would qualify as fair use. With now four complaints filed 
by the copyright owners of the photos on which New Portraits are based,3 
courts will soon answer this question—an answer much expected by con-
temporary artists and art professionals, considering the current blurriness of 
the fair use standard.4 
 
 The author would like to pay special thankfulness, warmth, and appreciation to Professor Jeanne C. 
Fromer and Nicolas Delon, for all their support and recommendations and to all anonymous reviewers. 
 1.  NANCY SPECTOR ET AL., RICHARD PRINCE 23 (2007). 
 2.  TONY SCHERMAN & DAVID DALTON, POP: THE GENIUS OF ANDY WARHOL 113 (2009). 
 3.  See, e.g., Julia Halperin, Instagram Model and Makeup Artist Sues Richard Prince Over Cop-
yright Infringement, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Aug. 26, 2016), http://old.theartnewspa-
per.com/news/news/instagram-model-and-makeup-artist-sues-richard-prince-over-copyright-infringe-
ment/; Eileen Kinsella, Sid Vicious’s Photographer Sues Richard Prince for Copyright Infringement, 
ARTNET NEWS (June 7, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/richard-prince-sid-vicious-copyright-
513263; Eileen Kinsella, Richard Prince Slapped With Yet Another Copyright Lawsuit, ARTNET NEWS 
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/richard-prince-copyright-lawsuit-754139; Eileen Kin-
sella, Outraged Photographer Sues Gagosian Gallery and Richard Prince for Copyright Infringement, 
ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 4, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/donald-graham-sues-gagosian-richard-
prince-401498; Mahita Gajanan, Controversial Artist Richard Prince Sued for Copyright Infringement, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/jan/04/richard-prince-
sued-copyright-infringement-rastafarian-instagram. 
 4.  See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 713 (2nd Cir. 2013) (Wallace, J., dissenting); see also Kim 
J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or Burn-Out of Transformativeness in Fair 
Use Jurisprudence? A Plea for a Neo-Traditional Approach, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 321, 323 (2014) (“Transformative use has, by steady accretion, come to dominate fair use case law, 
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In September 2014, New York City art gallery Gagosian exhibited the 
New Portraits series including 38 new works by Prince. Each image is an 
inkjet print of approximately 6 x 4 ft. which includes a portrait (sometimes a 
self-portrait) photograph originally posted by Instagram users on their feeds. 
Each work also features several comments from other users, including one 
from Prince (under his own name), beneath the photo.5 The individuals fea-
tured in the photos include several celebrities, such as model Kate Moss. 
Most of them feature young women in suggestive poses. 
The art world immediately reacted very vividly to Prince’s new work. 
“Possible cogent responses to [New Portraits] show include naughty delight 
and sincere abhorrence,”6 summarized art critic Peter Schjeldahl in The New 
Yorker. Some praised the artist, calling the work “[g]enius [t]rolling.”7 Some 
were shocked by the straightforward, effortless creation process—basically 
taking a snapshot, sending the image and having it printed.8 In a ‘meta’ re-
sponse, some of the unwilling subjects of his works, notably members of the 
Suicide Girls collective, re-appropriated ‘their’ New Portrait by adding a 
comment under Prince’s and started selling their own derivative works 
online for USD 90.9 And, of course, some—including the four people who 
filed complaints against Prince—considered that Prince’s work was plain 
and simple stealing, a clear (and outrageous) infringement of their copy-
rights. 
While the outcome of the case could adversely affect contemporary 
art,10 it may also be seen as a new provocation or challenge for lawyers. In-
deed, this is not the first time Prince has appropriated others’ works and been 
sued for it. Prince is one of the leading appropriation artists, assuming art 
ever was something other than appropriation. By appropriating other artists’ 
 
but has failed to provide the hoped-for consistent governing principles. It has, to the contrary, led courts 
to highly idiosyncratic results.”). 
 5.  Jerry Saltz, Richard Prince’s Instagram Paintings Are Genius Trolling, VULTURE (Sept. 23, 
2014), http://www.vulture.com/2014/09/richard-prince-instagram-pervert-troll-genius.html. 
 6.  Peter Schjeldahl, Richard Prince’s Instagram, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/richard-princes-instagrams. 
 7.  Saltz, supra note 5. 
 8.  Indeed, “Prince finds an image he likes, comments on it, makes a screen-grab with his iPhone, 
and sends the file — via email — to an assistant. From here, the file is cropped, printed as is, stretched, 
and presto: It’s art.” Id.  
 9.  Alex Needham, Richard Prince v Suicide Girls in an Instagram Price War, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/may/27/suicide-girls-richard-prince-
copying-instagram. 
 10.  See Brian Boucher, Why Experts Say the Latest Copyright Lawsuit Against Richard Prince 
Matters, ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/richard-prince-lawsuit-expert-
opinions-402173. 
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work as raw materials for their own work,11 appropriation artists are easy 
targets for infringement suits, even more so with the online proliferation of 
images and the banalization of digital copying techniques.12 As Professor 
Amy Adler argues, “contemporary art depends so deeply on copying in a 
way that makes it doomed to clash repeatedly with copyright law.”13 To-
gether with Jeff Koons, Prince perfectly illustrates this artistic (and legal) 
trend: in addition to being renowned as appropriation champions and two of 
the best-selling artists alive, they have lent their names to significant fair use 
case law and are therefore familiar to many lawyers interested in art. 
Surprisingly to some, Prince has not lost a single case thus far. He has 
somehow managed to convince the courts that his works were fair use, or 
settled with the plaintiff instead.14 However, one cannot rule out things turn-
ing out differently this time, considering not only the very similar (identical?) 
aesthetics of the New Portraits versus the original Instagram photos, but also 
given the current scope of the fair use doctrine that Prince has (involuntarily) 
helped to build through previous cases. 
This Article aims to bring defenses of New Portraits into a new light. It 
will not discuss the current scope or merits of the fair use doctrine, or how it 
should evolve to adapt to contemporary art (already the subject of much val-
uable scholarship).15 Instead, it adduces potential arguments open to a de-
fense of New Portraits given the current state of the law. After a brief sum-
mary of the fair use standard as currently defined by courts, in particular the 
preeminence of the “transformativeness” criterion,16 I will argue that New 
Portraits can fall under the parody doctrine and therefore be considered fair 
 
 11.  Art critic David Joselit argues, “contemporary art marginalizes the production of content in 
favor of producing new format for existing images.” DAVID JOSELIT, AFTER ART 58 (2013).  
 12.  See Barbara Pollack, Copy rights, ARTNEWS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.art-
news.com/2012/03/22/copy-rights/. 
 13.  Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 562 (2016). 
 14.  Even though the district court decided not to consider five out of thirty pieces in Prince’s Canal 
Zone series to be fair use, the Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court with respect 
to those five pieces for further evaluation whether Prince was entitled to fair use. Prince and Cariou ulti-
mately settled their dispute regarding the five remaining pieces outside of court. Cariou v. Prince, 714 
F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 15.  For a new two-factor fair use test, see John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation 
and Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 138–39 (1988) and E. Kenly Ames, 
Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard For Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1511–13 
(1993). For a First Amendment protection argument for appropriation art, see Darren H. Hick, Appropri-
ation and Transformation, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1155, 1171–72 (2013) (quot-
ing Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1578 (1984)). For a 
new “artistic purpose” standard leading the first factor inquiry, see Caroline L. McEneaney, Transform-
ative Use and Comment on the Original, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1521, 1547 (2013). For an argument to 
amend the Copyright Act to reform the fair use doctrine, see Debra L. Quentel, “Bad Artists Copy, Good 
Artists Steal”: The Ugly Conflict Between Copyright Law and Appropriationism, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
39, 64 (1996). 
 16.  See infra I. 
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use.17 I will further try to show how New Portraits, if they were to fail under 
the parody doctrine, could still pass the fair use test based on an extensive 
interpretation of its first factor, or by the transformativeness criterion as de-
signed by the Second Circuit in Cariou v. Prince.18 Please note that, for the 
purpose of this Article, I will primarily focus on courts’ opinions on visual 
arts as opposed to other copyrighted works. 
I. THE FAIR USE TEST AND THE PREEMINENCE OF THE 
TRANSFORMATIVENESS CRITERIA 
The fair use doctrine is provided in the Copyright Act which states sev-
eral non-exhaustive factors to be considered for a fair use inquiry. The first 
factor of the test is arguably the most critical.19 It relates to the purpose and 
character of the use and comes down to the question of whether a given new 
work is transformative.20 The second and third factors are usually less mate-
rial since they depend closely on the first factor: the second one relates to the 
nature of the work being copied,21 and the third one relates to the amount and 
substantiality of the portion of the original work used for the new one.22 The 
fourth factor looks at whether the new work usurps the primary and second-
ary markets for the original.23 But despite this four-prong test, whether or not 
the work is transformative under the first factor has become the driving factor 
of any fair use inquiry.24 
A. A specific yet non-exhaustive test from statutory 
source 
The fair use doctrine is codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 
1976, which sets four non-exclusive factors to be considered in determining 
fair use. Those factors are  
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes, (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
 
 17.  See infra II. 
 18.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706; see also infra III. 
 19.  See discussion infra Section A.A. 
 20.  See discussion infra Section A.B. 
 21.  See discussion infra Section A.C. 
 22.  See discussion infra Section A.D. 
 23.  See discussion infra Section A.E. 
 24.  See discussion infra Section A.F. 
  
326 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:2 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the 
effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.25  
 
Section 107 also provides examples of purposes for which a copy-
righted work may be fairly used, including criticism and comments.26 Sec-
tion 107 thus leaves much room for courts to decide what, in practice, may 
or may not constitute fair use. Determination of fair use is therefore very 
fact- and context-sensitive.27 
B. Factor 1: the purpose and character of the use, or 
whether the new work has a “new meaning” 
The first step of the fair use test relates to the purpose and character of 
the use. It aims at assessing whether “the new work merely ‘supersedes the 
objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a fur-
ther purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message . . . , in other words, whether and to what extent the 
new work is ‘transformative.’”28 This transformativeness factor directly ech-
oes the utilitarian rationale of copyright law, namely incentivizing creation 
and innovation.29 For a use to be considered fair, and therefore to escape the 
monopoly of the owner of the original work, the secondary use must “add 
something.” On this assumption, “[f]air use should . . . be perceived as an 
‘integral part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the ob-
jectives of the law.’”30 
It is worth noting that the commercial motivation of the user has become 
much less relevant for courts. Indeed, courts used to consider that a use for 
personal gains suggested bad faith and was dispositive of fair use.31 How-
ever, this approach was reversed in the Campbell v. Accuf-Rose opinion 
 
 25.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id. As underlined by the Supreme Court in Campbell, Section 107 calls for a “case by case 
analysis” and “provide[s] only general guidance[.]” Campbell v. Accuf-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
577–78 (1994).  
 28.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
579); see also Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (the sem-
inal article by Judge Level on the transformative test). 
 29.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 30.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 250 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 
539, 1107 (1985)). 
 31.  Id.; see generally Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 
(1984) (where the Supreme Court develops arguments on the dispositive nature of commercial gains when 
it comes to assessing fair use). 
   
2018 R. PRINCE’S NEW PORTRAITS—THE ART OF FAIR USE 327 
where the Supreme Court held that “[i]f, indeed, commerciality carried pre-
sumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow 
nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of Section 
107, including news reporting, comment, . . . since these actives are gener-
ally conducted for profit in this country.”32 
To assess whether the new work conveys a “new expression, meaning 
or message,” courts used to rely mainly on the author’s intent. In Blanch v. 
Koons (as in the district court decision in Cariou v. Prince), the court looked 
for such new meaning through the artist’s intent.33 However, the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals in Cariou v. Prince rejected this way of assessing “new 
meaning” and refocused the analysis on the aesthetics of the work, through 
a side-by-side comparison in search of significant physical alterations.34 As 
argued by many authors,35 this methodology seems at first sight irrelevant to 
assessments of meaning in contemporary art, for two reasons. First, contem-
porary art often focuses more on concepts than aesthetics. Second, not every 
observer can grasp the conceptual implications of any given contemporary 
work of art, especially when it comes to appropriation art. Yet, as discussed 
in Section III below, this shift from the author’s intent to the audience’s per-
ception may motivate adopting a broader approach to transformativeness, by 
relying on third-party views of the work. 
C. Factor 2: the nature of the work being copied, or 
whether it is creative 
The second factor of the fair use test relates to the nature of the work 
being copied. The creative, fictional or otherwise expressive nature of a work 
protected by copyright tends to go against a finding of fair use. For instance, 
in United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, the court stated, in accordance 
with higher courts’ precedents, that “fair use is less likely to be found when 
 
 32.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that the commercial nature of 
a use could be dispositive of fair use, thus emphasizing on the aggregate weighting of all four fair use 
factors. The Court noted that “nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, 
including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship and research . . . ‘are generally con-
ducted for profit’” and that “Congress could not have intended a rule that commercial uses are presump-
tively unfair.” Id. In addition, the Supreme Court noted in Blanch that “notwithstanding the fact that 
artists are sometimes paid and museums sometimes earn money, the public exhibition of art is widely and 
we think properly considered to ‘have value that benefits the broader public interest.’” Blanch, 467 F.3d 
at 254. 
 33.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251; see also Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 34.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707–08. 
 35.  See Adler, supra note 13 (for an account of the irrelevance of aesthetics comparison when it 
comes to contemporary art). 
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the original copyrighted work is fictional, rather than a factual or informa-
tional work such as a biography, a telephone directory, a textbook.”36 Courts 
may take into account various elements in assessing the nature of the copy-
righted work, such as “whether the original is creative, imaginative, or rep-
resents an investment of time and anticipation of a financial return also 
should be considered.”37 However, this factor is never dispositive of fair 
use.38 More specifically, courts tend to consider that the nature of the work 
copied is irrelevant when the first factor has been fulfilled, i.e., when the 
secondary work is transformative. In Blanch, the court expressly held that 
“[t]he second factor may be of lilted usefulness where the creative work of 
art is being used for a transformative purpose”39 In other words, this second 
factor tends to follow the findings under the first factor inquiry. 
D. Factor 3: Amount and substantiality of the portion 
used, or whether the copy is integral or not 
Under the third factor courts must look at the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used. Prince was sued by photographer Patrick Cariou in 2008 
for using photos of Rastafarians from Cariou’s Yes Rasta book in his Canal 
Zone series. Many of Prince’s artworks used Cariou’s works in whole or 
substantial parts of it. In some works, Prince hardly even altered much of the 
source photograph.40 To put things simply, this should have been bad for 
Prince. However, the Second Circuit considered this was not dispositive 
against fair use “because copying the entirety of a work is sometimes neces-
sary to make a fair use of the image.”41 Giving the third factor a similar treat-
ment as the second one, the court held that “the extent of permissible copying 
varies with the purpose and character of the use.”42 
 
 36.  United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 37.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 38.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257. 
 39.  Id. (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2006)). As 
underlined by the Court in Blanch, “[a]ccepting that [Silk Sandal] is a creative work, though, it does not 
follow that the second fair-use factor, even if somewhat favors Blanch, has significant implication for on 
our overall fair-use analysis.” Id. at 257. The court concluded the second factor had limited weight “be-
cause Koons used Blanch’s work in a transformative manner to comment on her image’s social and aes-
thetic meaning rather than to exploit its creative virtues.” Id. The same reasoning was applied in Cariou. 
See 714 F.3d at 710. 
 40.  See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710 (noting that Prince did not alter the source photography very much 
at all in his work titled Charlie Company). 
 41.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710 (quoting Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613). 
 42.  Id. 
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E. Factor 4: the effect of the use on the potential market 
for, or value of, the copyrighted work, or whether the 
secondary work usurps the original work’s markets 
The fourth factor shifts the focus from the works to their markets. By 
assessing the effect of the use on the potential market for, or value of, the 
copyrighted work, it comes back (again) to the utilitarian rationale of copy-
right law by asking whether the secondary work economically harms the 
copyright owner by usurping the market(s) of the former work or its deriva-
tive works. In Blanch, the court found that “Koons’s use of her photograph 
did not cause any harm to her career or upset any plans she had for ‘Silk 
Sandals’ or any other photograph, and that the value of ‘Silk Sandals’ did 
not decrease as the result of Koons’s alleged infringement.”43 The Second 
Circuit went further in the Cariou opinion and clarified that usurpation is 
established “where the infringer’s target audience and the nature of the in-
fringing content is the same as the original.”44 But here again, the first factor 
weighs in the analysis and market substitution is less certain when the second 
use is transformative.45 
F. Transformativeness as the driving factor in the fair 
use test 
As shown above, the first factor is leading in the fair use inquiry. As 
summarized by Professor Amy Adler, “[s]ince 1994, fair use, in all its com-
plexity, has boiled down to a deceptively basic question: Is the new work 
‘transformative?’”46 More specifically: Does it add something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with the new expres-
sion, meaning or message, or does it merely supersede the original? Despite 
its simplicity, this question is particularly tricky for contemporary art given 
the difficulty faced by courts in articulating the criteria for finding transform-
ativeness, as discussed above. Courts themselves have recently recognized 
that whether or not a work is transformative has become a highly contentious 
issue.47 So the question I address here is not so much: Is the New Portraits 
series fair use? but rather: Is the New Portraits series transformative in light 
of the standard built by precedents? 
 
 43.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 258. 
 44.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709. 
 45.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994). 
 46.  Adler, supra note 13, at 562. 
 47.  Seltzer v. Green Day Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Jacqueline Morley, 
The Unfettered Expansion of Appropriation Art by the Fair Use Doctrine: Searching for Transformative-
ness in Cariou v. Prince and Beyond, 55 IDEA: THE INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 385, 411 (2015). 
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The next Section examines the extent to which New Portraits can be 
seen as a parody of the underlying works— hence as highly transformative—
and consequently qualify as fair use. 
II. NEW PORTRAITS FALLS WITHIN THE PARODY DOCTRINE 
After briefly laying out the definition of parody as designed by the Su-
preme Court,48 I will show that New Portraits can qualify as parody because, 
both expressly and impliedly, they comment on the photographs selected by 
the artist,49 and because they clearly acknowledge the presence and source 
of these original photographs.50 Once the parodic nature of New Portraits is 
established, then the three remaining factors of the fair use test will not weigh 
against a finding of fair use.51 
A. The definition of parody 
I argue that New Portraits could be considered a parody of the underly-
ing photographs and thus strongly support a fair use defense. Parody was 
precisely the use invoked by the alleged infringed in the last major case on 
fair use decided by the Supreme Court, i.e., Campbell. In this case the Su-
preme Court defined parody as “the use of some elements of a prior author’s 
composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that au-
thor’s work.”52 The Court further explains that “[p]arody’s humor, or in any 
event its comment, necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its ob-
ject through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the tension between a known 
original and its parodic twin.”53 The Court further held that “[i]t is this join-
der of reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s choice of parody 
from the other types of comment and criticism that traditionally have had a 
claim to fair use protection as transformative works.”54 The Court also de-
fined parody by contrast with satire. It ruled that “[p]arody needs to mimic 
an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its 
victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its 
own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”55 
 
 48.  See discussion infra Section A.A. 
 49.  See discussion infra Section A.B. 
 50.  See discussion infra Section A.C. 
 51.  See discussion infra Section A.D. 
 52.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
 53.  Id. at 588. 
 54.  Id. at 583. 
 55.  Id. at 580–81. 
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In Campbell, the Supreme Court also underlined that despite its gener-
ally high transformative value, parody does not benefit from any presump-
tion of fair use. The Court notably underlined that “[l]ike a book review quot-
ing the copyrighted material criticized, parody may or may not be fair use.”56 
 This being said, the standard for assessing whether a parodic work may 
be considered transformative seems low. According to the Supreme Court in 
Campbell, “[t]he threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of par-
ody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”57 This 
standard is therefore objective and relies on the potential perception of a rea-
sonable viewer. Accordingly, I understand that two elements are required to 
establish the parodic nature of a work: (i) the new work may reasonably be 
perceived as commenting on the original work (as opposed to the genre or 
the topic of the original work), by distorting it in a manner that makes it 
transformative, and (ii) the original work must be acknowledged and recog-
nizable by the viewers. 
B. New Portraits comments, both expressly and im-
pliedly, on the underlying Instagram photographs 
As mentioned above, to be considered parodic a secondary works needs 
to comment on the original work used. In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures,58 
defendant had used a famous nude portrait of pregnant Demi Moore by An-
nie Leibovitz in an advertisement for an upcoming movie, by mimicking 
Moore’s style and pose in a new photo feature one (male) actor of the movie. 
According to the court,  
 
[p]lainly, the ad adds something new and qualifies as ‘trans-
formative’ work. Whether it ‘comments’ on the original is a 
somewhat closer question. Because the smirking face of 
Nielsen contrasts so strikingly with the serious expression 
on the face of Moore, the ad may reasonably be perceived 
as commenting on the seriousness, even the pretentiousness, 
of the original.59  
 
 
 56.  Id. at 581. 
 57.  Id. at 582. 
 58.  137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 59.  Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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The assessment of the parodic nature of the secondary work is based on this 
objective standard according to which critical comments on the original work 
can reasonably be expected to be noticed. 
Assessing whether New Portraits’ comment on the original Instagram 
photographs may seem challenging, considering the fact that Prince used 
them without distorting them aesthetically. On the face of it, it does look like 
Prince was not interested in the specific images he selected but rather in the 
genre (scenarized portraits posted on Instagram). Under this interpretation, 
New Portraits could be seen as a satire of e.g., social media (see Section III 
below). However, what makes the series interesting and valuable for the art 
world lies precisely in Prince selecting these specific pictures, their being 
original posts, and commenting as a way of “rebranding” as one’s own. No 
one knows that any other selection would have had a comparable effect. And 
had Prince not used actual Instagram posts, his work would most likely have 
been pointless and devoid of value. 
On the assumption that Prince used these specific Instagram posts for 
themselves (and not only as illustrations of a genre), his work can be seen as 
commenting on them (rather than just about social media users generally), 
and as a result qualify as parody. Even if some may find the parodic nature 
of New Portraits subtler than in Leibovitz, there is little doubt for observers 
even remotely familiar with Prince’s work, name, or contemporary art for 
that matter, that Prince was commenting on these specific photos. Indeed, 
one may argue that each of the New Portraits highlight the vanity, ubiquity, 
and lack of authenticity of each of the representations selected on Instagram, 
not only by putting his name under the photographs and therefore “rebrand-
ing” them, but by expressly commenting on them (before taking the snap-
shots, Prince commented on each post under his own name). But for any 
piece of work to be considered parodic under Campbell, it must not only 
comment on the original work being used, viewers must also be able to rec-
ognize in some way the underlying original. 
C. The original photographs used in New Portraits are 
recognizable by the viewers 
The parody doctrine not only requires that the parody comment on the 
original work, it also requires that the latter be acknowledged. In Rogers v. 
Koons, the court refused to consider Koons’s sculpture String of Puppies as 
a parody of Roger’s photograph because it failed to acknowledge and inform 
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the viewer of the presence of an underlying original work attributable to an-
other author.60 The court underlines that “[t]his awareness may come from 
the fact that the copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in 
some manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection with the par-
ody.”61 In other words, such attribution may result from the fact that the orig-
inal work is widely known, but also from a direct attribution within the sec-
ondary work. This “recognition” element is seen by the Rogers court as a 
condition for a potential finding of parody. 
Here, New Portraits clearly acknowledge the reference to the original 
work. First, this recognition results from the fact that the photographs are 
entirely copied. This makes it very unlikely that the public will ignore that 
the photographs in New Portraits are distinct preexisting works. Moreover, 
the fact that each of Prince’s works features the Instagram users’ names right 
above the photographs confirms this. Indeed, the public is not only made 
aware of the existence of a stand-alone underlying work, but also of its 
(likely) author, if only through a nickname, unlike in Rogers.62 In fact, ac-
knowledging the existence of the underlying works while commenting on 
them may be precisely what Prince intended through his New Portraits. 
D. The three other fair use factors would not weigh 
against a finding of fair use if the parodic nature of 
New Portraits was established 
If New Portraits qualifies as a parody of each underlying (copied) 
photo, then transformativeness is more easily established. And, as seen in 
Section I above, a high level of transformativeness weighs heavily in the 
analysis of the three other factors of the fair use inquiry. The second factor 
would bend in light of the highly transformative nature of the works. The 
third factor would not weigh against fair use, given that parody precisely 
needs to conjure up a portion of the original work that is sufficient for the 
audience to recognize it.63 In our case, as in Leibovitz, the parody could only 
be achieved by copying photos in their entirety. “Copying does not become 
excessive in relation to parodic purpose merely because the portion taken 
 
 60.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Willajeanne F. McLean, All’s Not 
Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use Defense After Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 373, 
403 (1993). 
 61.  Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. The court considered Koons’s String of Puppies did not ridicule 
Roger’s photograph because the object of the sculpture, satirical, was neither acknowledged nor known 
well enough to be recognized. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
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was the original’s heart.”64 Otherwise the parodic character would not be 
recognizable. 
As for the fourth factor, courts usually consider that when the secondary 
use is parodic, there cannot be market substitution. This follows the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Campbell, according to which, 
 
[t]here is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The 
market for potential derivative uses includes only those that 
creators of original works would in general develop or li-
cense others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators 
of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lam-
poons of their own productions removes such uses from the 
very notion of a potential licensing market.65  
 
Indeed, “[a]s to parody pure and simple, it is unlikely that the work will act 
as a substitute for the original, since the two works usually serve different 
market functions.”66 
Based on the above it would not be unreasonable for a court to hold that 
the New Portraits works are parodies and therefore fair use of the original 
photographs. However, Prince’s art generally challenges the notions of au-
thorship and originality. As argued by Professor Amy Adler, Prince 
“[o]rphans the work, introducing it into a chain of re-users, none of whom 
ever really owned it, none of whom are original, and none of whom can con-
trol it.”67 Referring to Prince’s artistic project, a court could well find that 
the use of any other Instagram photos would actually have led to the same 
result. On that basis, the parodic nature of the work could not be asserted. 
This is why we will now turn to the alternative argument that the New Por-
traits series, even if not a parody, remains transformative enough to be con-
sidered fair use. 
III. ALTERNATIVELY, NEW PORTRAITS ARE TRANSFORMATIVE 
ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE FAIR USE 
Arguing that New Portraits is fair use without using the parody doctrine 
appears challenging. However, despite the blurriness around the interpreta-
tion of the first factor, I believe the recent shift towards a more audience-
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 592. 
 66.  Id. at 570–71. 
 67.  Adler, supra note 13, at 598. 
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based inquiry under the first factor can be very helpful to establish New Por-
traits’ transformativeness.68 If a new meaning can be perceived by looking 
at New Portraits, then the second and third factor of the test will not weigh 
against a finding of fair use.69 As for the fourth factor, the absence of any 
market usurpation by Prince—quite the opposite in fact—would not only 
support a finding of fair use, but could also be seen as a further way to prove 
the transformativeness of New Portraits.70 
A. The challenge of assessing New Portraits’ transform-
ativeness 
The difficulty of finding transformativeness in appropriation art, and 
therefore for New Portraits, is caused by its post-modern conceptual pur-
pose, and more specifically by the difficulty of assessing Prince’s intent or 
intended meaning,71 and by the fact that a side-by-side comparison of the 
two-works’ aesthetics would not be helpful to support transformativeness.72 
However, the recent shift in case law from the author’s intent to the public’s 
perception may actually be relevant to support a finding of transformative-
ness in New Portraits because it enables to identify potential new mean-
ings.73 
1. The difficulty of articulating Prince’s intent 
The artist’s intent in creating the new work has long been a key element 
for courts when assessing whether it is transformative. In Blanch, Koons had 
reused parts of a photo made by plaintiff as part of his “Niagara” collage 
painting. The original photo was an ad picture showing a woman’s legs. 
Koons’s collage features several pairs of legs, including those from Blanch’s 
photograph. The Second Circuit found that the use was transformative be-
cause of differing purposes between the two works, and because, as a conse-
quence, Koons’s use of the photo conveyed new information, aesthetics and 
insights.74 To reach this conclusion, the court used Koons’s statements and 
considered that he had established a proper justification for borrowing the 
picture based on the following declaration: “the photograph is typical of a 
 
 68.  See discussion infra Section A.A. 
 69.  See discussion infra Section A.B. 
 70.  See discussion infra Section A.C. 
 71.  See discussion infra Section 1.a.1. 
 72.  See discussion infra Section 1.a.2. 
 73.  See discussion infra Section 1.a.3. 
 74.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2006) (The court specifically highlights the 
“entirely different purpose and meaning” of the objects pictured to conclude that the use in question was 
transformative.). 
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certain style of mass communication. . . . . By using an existing image, I also 
ensure a certain authenticity or veracity that enhances my commentary.”75 
Based on these statements, the court considered that “Koons saw certain cri-
teria in the notecard that he thought made it a workable source. He believed 
it to be typical, commonplace and familiar . . . . [H]e viewed the picture as 
part of the mass culture—’resting in the collective sub-consciousness of peo-
ple regardless of whether the card had actually ever been seen by such peo-
ple.’”76 
The district court’s opinion in Cariou v. Prince reiterated the “require-
ment that the new work in some way comment on, relate to the historical 
context of, or critically refers back to the original works,”77 and interpreting 
again this requirement in light of the artist’s intent to create the work. Based 
on Prince’s testimony (which some may consider part of his artistic project)78 
that he did not have any intent to comment on Cariou’s photographs or on 
aspects of society more broadly,79 the district court granted summary judg-
ment to Cariou. Prince’s statement that he did not have any specific intent in 
creating Canal Zone was immediately dispositive of fair use of the court. 
Similarly, relying on Prince’s intent in creating New Portraits may prove 
difficult. Considering that the absence of meaning in images lies at the core 
of Prince’s postmodern work, to the point where Prince’s statements in Car-
iou v. Prince could be considered part of the work of art itself,80 asking again 
for Prince to articulate a clear transformative intent might be a perilous path. 
Nevertheless, courts have recently adopted a different approach when it 
comes to determining whether new work has new meaning, which we will 
now investigate. 
2. Aesthetic side-by-side comparisons are silent 
on New Portraits’ transformativeness 
The artist’s intent is not necessarily relevant when it comes to assessing 
whether a work of art incorporating another work of art has a new meaning, 
as recently acknowledged by the Second Circuit. In Cariou, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision (based 
 
 75.  Id. at 255. 
 76.  Id. at 305 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 77.  Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 78.  See generally Adler, supra note 13, at 588–89 (for more details on Prince’s declared intent (or 
absence thereof) when creating the Canal Zone series). 
 79.  Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. On appeal, Prince argued that his reluctance to express a clear 
message for the Canal Zone series was aligned with the postmodern background of his whole art and the 
absence of any set and defined meaning. Joint Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Appellants at 
29, Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1197-CV). 
 80.  See Adler, supra note 13, at 589. 
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on the Rogers reasoning),81 and ruled that the absence of articulated com-
ments from the author on the original work was not dispositive of transform-
ativeness, reiterating the non-exhaustive nature of the enumeration in Sec-
tion 107 of the Copyright Act.82 
In this opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s deci-
sion and ruled that “the law does not require that a secondary use comment 
on the original artist or work, or popular culture.”83 In this case, Prince had 
used photographs from Cariou’s Yes Rasta in a series of paintings and col-
lages titled Canal Zone. Prince had significantly altered most of the photo-
graphs, mainly by painting lozenges over their subject’s faces, and by using 
only portions of the pictures.84 Based on the Campbell ruling, the court con-
sidered that Prince’s series had an entirely different aesthetic than Cariou’s 
photographs, and that Canal Zone was transformative “even without com-
menting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even without Prince’s stated 
intention to do so.”85 
To support its finding of fair use, the court asserted that “Prince’s im-
ages . . . have a different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expres-
sion, and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative results 
distinct from Cariou’s.”86 The court put its focus on the works themselves, 
and more specifically on “how the work in question appears to the reasonable 
observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body 
of work.”87 The focus therefore turned from the artist’s subjective intent (as-
suming it can be articulated) to the aesthetics of the works and whether the 
two works, compared side-by-side, appear to have different “new expression, 
meaning, or message.”88 In other words, the Cariou decision from the Court 
of Appeals marked the “shift away from the singular, subjective intent of the 
putative fair user towards a more audience-focused inquiry.”89 
Based on these criteria, the court considered that 25 of Prince’s works 
were fair use, but remanded five works to the district court to assess trans-
formativeness, because Prince’s alterations were not significant enough to 
allow the court to directly find fair use. The fact that the court did not find 
that these five works were fair use can be troubling, especially since these 
 
 81.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712. 
 82.  Id. at 707–08. 
 83.  Id. at 698. 
 84.  Id. at 699. 
 85.  Id. at 707 (emphasis added). 
 86.  Id. at 708 (emphasis added). 
 87.  Id. at 707. 
 88.  Id. at 706. 
 89.  Andrew Gilden & Timothy Green, Fair Use for the Rich and Fabulous?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 88, 88 (2013). 
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works were aesthetically very similar to some of the other 25 other that the 
court deemed fair use. 
With New Portraits, a side-by-side comparison would not be very help-
ful for Prince’s defense. Indeed, the only alterations that Prince made con-
sisted in including comments (including his) under the photos, which remain 
unaltered in themselves. A reasonable observer could well consider, in light 
of Cariou v. Prince, that a side-by-side comparison is dispositive of fair use. 
As this strict application of the Cariou precedent to New Portraits shows, a 
side-by-side comparison by any reasonable observer may preclude lots of 
works from adequate protection by the fair use doctrine.90 Such a standard 
can be relevant for many appropriation artists. However, it still fails to cap-
ture the conceptual nature of appropriation art and to address the issues raised 
by verbatim copying like Sherrie Levine’s After Walker Evans or Prince’s 
New Portraits.91 Indeed, in contemporary art generally, but even more so in 
appropriation art, “the artist’s technical skills are less important than his con-
ceptual ability to place images in different settings and, thereby, change their 
meaning. Appropriation art has been commonly described ‘as getting the 
hand out of art and putting the brain in.’”92 Looking only in the square picture 
of the work might be the wrong question to ask when assessing whether new 
work has new meaning. As emphasized by Professor Amy Adler,  
 
[a]s we know from the history of art, an artist can affect a 
work’s meaning with nothing more than a few minor ges-
tures. The aesthetics philosopher Nelson Goodman wrote: 
‘Extremely subtle changes can alter the whole design, feel-
ing, or expression of a painting. Indeed, the slightest percep-
tual differences sometimes matter the most aesthetically . . . 
.’93  
 
Relying too heavily on aesthetics may actually lead one to miss the real 
change in meaning in the reappropriated work. As argued by some, “[t]he 
precedent set in Cariou v. Prince infantilizes appropriation art by requiring 
 
 90.  Johnathan Francis, On Appropriation: Cariou v. Prince and Measuring Contextual Transfor-
mation in Fair Use, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 681, 713 (2014) (“The Cariou transformation test divorces 
artwork, especially appropriation artwork, from an individual’s contextual and experiential engagement 
with the artwork.”). 
 91.  Id. at 702–03. 
 92.  Rachel Isabelle Butt, Appropriation Art and Fair Use, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1055, 
1060 (2010) (quoting William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (2000)). 
 93.  Adler, supra note 13, at 605 (quoting NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART: AN APPROACH 
TO A THEORY OF SYMBOLS 108 (1976)). 
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courts to compare two works of art based on facially observable content al-
terations, as opposed to the purpose or conceptual innovation of the artist.”94 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit ruling’s swift from the artist to the 
public may be seen as an opportunity to broaden the category of reference 
viewers by including art expert’s opinions. 
 
3. Shifting from intent to perception: how art 
professionals’ opinions matter to assessing 
transformativeness in New Portraits 
It could be argued that the court referred to the works’ aesthetics in 
Cariou only as one empirical basis for its finding of distinct “creative and 
communicative results,”95 one proxy, among others, for finding new mean-
ing. More specifically, aesthetics could be considered one way, among oth-
ers, that a “reasonable observer” could assess new meaning in secondary 
work. On this assumption, I suggest there is a case to be made for Prince 
based on the Cariou opinion. Indeed, the Cariou court seems to acknowledge 
the limits of this aesthetics-only approach to transformativeness. When the 
court held that “[a] secondary work may modify the original without being 
transformative,”96 this may simply mean that not just any physical alteration 
will pass the transformativeness test. But this may also be the court acknowl-
edging the conceptual nature of art. If alterations are not sufficient for new 
meaning something else must be responsible for it. In fact, alterations may 
not even be necessary. A secondary work can be transformative without 
much modification to the original work. Hence, the Cariou opinion moti-
vates a shift in focus from the aesthetics of the works to the audience’s per-
ception of its meaning. 
Focusing on the artworks as they are perceived to assess transforma-
tiveness may seem challenging when it comes to appropriation art. As argued 
by Professor Amy Adler, “art is no longer ‘something primarily to be looked 
at.’”97 While acknowledging the increasingly conceptual nature of art, I be-
lieve that the concrete object embodying the work still matters, even in ap-
propriation art. This is why people visit museum and galleries, and why some 
spend millions on artworks. Therefore, referring to the works of art in them-
 
 94.  Shoshana Rosenthal, Note, A Critique of the Reasonable Observer: Why Fair Use Fails to Pro-
tect Appropriation Art, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 445, 450 (2015).  
 95.  Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Adler, supra note 13, at 601 (quoting A. C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART: CONTEMPORARY 
ART AND THE PALE OF HISTORY, 16 (1997)). 
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selves for assessing transformativeness is not necessarily ill suited to con-
temporary art. Taking account of the materiality of artworks makes all the 
more sense the “reasonable observer” referred to by the Court of Appeals 
need not be bad news for appropriation artists. Granted, relying on the aver-
age observer’s judgement may be tricky, insofar as the underlying theories 
of appropriation art are hardly widespread. Yet, the shift from the artist’s 
intent to the reasonable observer refocuses our attention onto audiences more 
generally and the (new) message they can potentially perceive. A reasonable 
observer need not be totally alien contemporary art. There is nothing in the 
court’s opinion preventing any supplementation of the “reasonable observer” 
test by art amateurs or experts.98 After all, courts already regularly rely on 
expert testimony to assess infringement, and more precisely to determine 
“substantial similarity.” To support this, some scholars have drawn a parallel 
between art and computer programs to determine whether an average audi-
ence is well positioned to make the assessment.99 Indeed, even in fine arts, 
courts sometimes defer to the art world’s judgement, as shown in some au-
thenticity cases and defended by copyright scholars such as Professor Jeanne 
C. Fromer.100 Also, courts sometimes take into account how target audi-
ences, not just any average audience, perceive art, in order to assess the po-
tential meaning or effects of visual art, especially in cases involving child 
pornography.101 Hence, despite Cariou’s court’s reference to the “average 
observer,” strong arguments support the provision of art experts’ opinions to 
establish New Portraits’ meaning and transformativeness. 
On that basis, a reasonable yet informed observer of New Portraits 
could well find that the series conveys new meaning. The use of expert tes-
timony or statements from the target audience for the purpose of comparing 
 
 98.  See generally id.; see also Rosenthal, supra note 94, at 460. 
 99.  Rosenthal, supra note 94, at 462; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that expert evidence is 
admissible when “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”) (emphasis added). 
 100.  See, e.g., Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation, 70 A.D.3d 88, 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009) (“Since art authentication involves the exercise of the expert’s informed judgment, it is highly 
subjective, and even highly regarded and knowledgeable experts may disagree on questions of authenti-
cation. Simply put, determinations of the authenticity of art work are complex and highly subjective as-
sertions of fact. As such, disputes concerning authenticity are particularly ill-suited to resolution by de-
claratory judgment. The law cannot give an art owner a clear legal right to a declaration of authenticity 
when such a declaration by definition will not be definitive.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Jeanne 
C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
1251, 1288–89 (2014). 
 101.  This is particularly true for child pornography cases where courts assess whether or not the 
pictures depict a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” by relying on pedophiles’ perception. See U.S. v. 
Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994) (where the court suggested on this basis that a playground is a 
sexual setting); see also U.S. v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 441 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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works side-by-side would be extremely helpful for appropriation art in gen-
eral, and for Prince in particular (considering his international recognition by 
art professionals). This informed observer could base her finding of a poten-
tial new meaning on many art critics’ opinions about New Portraits, such as: 
 
 it’s what he does in the comments field that is truly brilliant, 
and which adds layers on top of the disconcerting images. 
Here he is delving as deep as he ever has into privacy, cop-
yright, and appropriation, twisting images so that they actu-
ally seem to undergo some sort of sick psychic-artistic tran-
substantiation where they no longer belong to the original 
makers;102  
 
or: “Prince’s appropriations of existing photographs are never merely copies 
of the already available. Instead, they extract a kind of photographic uncon-
scious from the image, bringing to the fore suppressed truths about its mean-
ing and its making.”103 A reasonable observer could find that New Portraits’ 
new message is one of vanity, artificiality, and lack of originality, like “an 
invitation to think anew of an already accepted reality.”104 In addition to en-
abling courts to make more informed decisions based on knowledge they 
might miss (as with computer programs), this approach would also keep the 
fair use doctrine consistent and compliant with its First Amendment ration-
ales, i.e., that fair use “does not require that meaning be understood or valued 
unanimously.”105 
As soon as New Portraits’ transformativeness would be established, 
mainly by experts or professional testimonies, the commercial nature of 
Prince’s work would be irrelevant, as stated by the Supreme Court in Camp-
bell. As noted by the Cariou court, “[a]lthough there is no question that 
Prince’s artworks are commercial, we do not place much significance on that 
fact due to the transformative nature of the work.”106 Nevertheless, the three 
other factors of the fair use test would still require examination. 
 
 102. Jerry Saltz, Richard Prince’s Instagram Paintings Are Genius Trolling, VULTURE (Sept. 23, 
2014), http://www.vulture.com/2014/09/richard-prince-instagram-pervert-troll-genius.html. 
 103.  SPECTOR, supra note 1, at 26. 
 104.  Id. at 22. 
 105.  Brief for the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. and the Robert Rauschenberg 
Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Further Evidentiary Proceedings for Purposes of Determining 
Fair Use on Remand at 7 n.6, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2013) (No. 08-
CIV-11327). 
 106.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708. 
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B. Factors 2 and 3 are made irrelevant to fair use by 
transformativeness 
As for the three remaining factors, they would likely be of little signif-
icance if transformativeness were to be established. In Cariou, the Second 
Circuit used transformativeness (the first factor) as the central focus of the 
fair use inquiry.107 As for the second factor, the court concluded that the fact 
that Cariou’s work was published and creative was of limited significance as 
transformativeness was established.108 Similarly, the court disposed quickly 
of the third factor and considered that the amount and substantiality factor 
should be interpreted in conjunction with transformativeness.109 Finally, the 
court held that the more transformative the use, the less significant the mar-
ket substitution factor.110 In other words, based on a strict interpretation of 
the Cariou opinion, the three other factors would probably not bar any fair 
use finding should Prince’s work be considered transformative. 
C. Factor 4 supports the finding of transformativeness of 
New Portraits under factor 1 
The fourth factor (market substitution) could prove particularly helpful 
for Prince’s defense. In Cariou, despite the fact that the plaintiff was a fa-
mous professional photographer, the court held that “Prince’s audience is 
very different from Cariou’s, and there is no evidence that Prince’s work 
ever touched—much less usurped—either the primary or derivative market 
for Cariou’s work . . . Prince’s work appeals to an entirely different sort of 
collector than Cariou’s.”111 The same reasoning can be used for New Por-
traits: what makes New Portraits valuable for the art world is not related to 
the value of the original underlying photographs.112 Prince’s art value does 
not really reside in the photos and the underlying comments in themselves, 
but rather on their selection by Prince as some kind of curator of our society 
on social media.113 To me, the absence of any market substitution between 
 
 107.  See Sarah L. Cronin & Joshua M. Keesan, The Art of Appropriation Cariou v. Prince Concerns 
Whether Art That Incorporates Copyrighted Material Is Sufficiently Transformative to Qualify As Fair 
Use, 37-MAR L.A. LAW. 23, 26 (2014). 
 108.  Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709–10. 
 109.  Id. at 710. 
 110.  Id. (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 
1998)). 
 111.  Id. at 709. 
 112.  For a general argument that appropriation art does not usurp any market share for the original 
work, see id. at 708–09. 
 113.  Adler, supra note 13, at 572. 
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Cariou and Prince even seems an additional element in favor of transforma-
tiveness because it clearly demonstrates that almost identical pictures can 
have different markets, which means that they have different audiences and 
that the target audience of the secondary work most likely perceives some 
meaning or message that is lacking in the original image.114 
The issue of secondary markets may seem more complex, since it in-
volves a more hypothetical projection of licensing options available to the 
initial work. As pointed out by some authors, this inquiry entails a circular 
analysis.115 Indeed, “a work has licensing value if it is used in the secondary 
work, but the value is dependent on the transformativeness of that secondary 
work.”116 For this reason, among others, the inquiry often leads to overvalu-
ation of the initial work.117 In any case, for reasons that also apply to the 
primary market, New Portraits would not usurp any secondary market share 
of the original works. 
It could even be argued that, in addition to not usurping any market 
shares from the authors of the original photographs, Prince actually caused 
some kind of increase in their market value (in demand), as shown by the 
sale of some of their photos by the Suicide Girls collective. Even if the Sui-
cide Girls’ works were sold USD 90 (as opposed to the USD 90,000 report-
edly cashed by Prince for the sale of one of his New Portraits), one could 
argue that the Suicide Girls had (almost) no market for the sale of their pic-
tures before being appropriated by Prince. The same logic likely applied to 
Mannie Garcia whose photograph of President Barack Obama sold for higher 
prices after Shepard Fairey had appropriated it in his famous Hope poster 
work.118 
Hence, I conclude that New Portraits would successfully pass the fourth 
factor test. The upshot of this inquiry could prove helpful for the purpose of 
assessing the work’s transformative nature under the first prong of the fair 
use test. 
 
 114.  While I believe that the fourth factor could be used in a more elaborate manner by courts to 
feed the transformativeness analysis regarding New Portraits, I disagree with Professor Amy Adler when 
she argues that it should become the leading factor in the fair use test. Despite the challenges raised by 
Cariou v. Prince for contemporary art, I appreciate that art history includes many examples of artists 
whose value became obvious long after their works were created (V. Van Gogh might be a case in point). 
Id. at 621. Prof. Adler pleads for “giving renewed primacy to the market inquiry under the now diminished 
fourth factor of the test” in a way which would “take courts out of the doomed and unpredictable enter-
prise of adjudicating meaning.” Id. 
 115.   See e.g., Francis, supra note 90; see also Noam Cohen, Viewing Journalism as a Work of Art, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/arts/design/24photo.html. 
 116.  Francis, supra note 90, at 708. 
 117.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
A decade ago, Professor Lawrence Lessig noted that “fair use in Amer-
ica simply means the right to hire a lawyer.”119 As this Article illustrates, this 
is especially true of appropriation artists, considering current precedents on 
the fair use doctrine—and considering that some of them can actually afford 
long legal proceedings. The blurriness of the fair use test as applied to con-
temporary art seems to favor rich artists, such as Prince, and can therefore 
have a chilling effect on more modest artists. At the same time, it could be 
argued that some of these artists can afford these suits, and that going beyond 
what the law clearly authorizes by relying more and more on copying is 
somehow inherent to their work. Although this may sound cliché, “art often 
uses law as a creative starting point, a boundary to break rather than fol-
low.”120 Yet I believe this trend, if rebel on its face, also has a constructive 
legal dimension. Works like the New Portraits that are legally disruptive can 
help courts better define the fair use doctrine by adapting the contour of the 
first factor in light of new trends in contemporary art. In the long term, this 
could prove beneficial for all potential creators, including more minor artists. 
Despite its blurriness, there is no denying that recent case law on parody 
and more generally on fair use in visual art focuses increasingly on the audi-
ence’s potential perception. On this basis, I have argued that there are strong 
arguments under current case law to support the view that New Portraits 
constitutes fair use because a reasonable (and reasonably informed) observer 
would probably find that Prince’s works can count as parodies of the under-
lying works (or at least involve commenting that is transformative). Moreo-
ver, I have suggested that the inquiry under the fourth factor would be very 
favorable to Prince because New Portraits don’t usurp any primary or sec-
ondary markets shares from the original underlying photographs. In fact, 
New Portraits likely created some form of market for the originals, which 
they did not have beforehand. What with the first and fourth factors, using 
target audiences as the reference standard would be very helpful to support 
a fair use defense. However, this audience-focused approach to transforma-
tiveness also runs the risk of a more elitist conception of the arts, which could 
end up inducing a chilling effect on more minor (or just less well known) 
artists.121 Indeed, “it is important that the new boundaries of fair use are not 
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set by socioeconomic status or judicial distinctions between high and low 
art.”122 Nevertheless, having an elitist approach to fair use would only be 
consistent with the generally elitist approach of the art market itself, and it is 
doubtful that the role of judges includes determining assess what is valuable 
in art (hence deserves more protection) and what is not. 
 
 
 122.  Id. at 104. 
